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OIL AND GAS
by
John L. Roach*

T

HE oil and gas problems dealt with by Texas courts during the survey
period included the following areas of special interest: (1) the Mineral
Interest Pooling Act, (2) interpretation of the term "minerals" concerning
coal and lignite, (3) perpetuation or termination of oil and gas leases, and (4)
conflicts between holders of different types of mineral interests. Each of
these areas will be examined in this Article.
I.

THE MINERAL INTEREST POOLING ACT

The Mineral Interest Pooling Act,' adopted in 1965 and amended in 1971,
continues to be the source of controversy and litigation. Nevertheless, during
the survey period only two cases which were decided under this Act are
worthy of comment.
Windsor Gas Corp. v. Railroad Commission2 involved a novel attempt by
the owner of a lease covering an undivided mineral interest to apply the Act to
force the co-tenant owning the remaining undivided mineral interest to pool
his interest. Plaintiff Windsor owned or controlled leases covering an undivided two-thirds of the minerals in 14,537 acres. Windsor attempted to lease
the remaining one-third interest, but the owner refused to execute a lease. The
owner of the one-third interest then proposed the drilling of a single well by
Windsor with the costs attributable to the one-third interest to be recovered
by Windsor out of production. Windsor made an offer, which apparently
crossed in the mail with the owner's proposal, in which Windsor propbsed
that (1) the parties enter into a single agreement covering eight wells, and (2)
the owner of the one-third interest pre-pay his estimated one-third of the
$160,000 cost of each well or that Windsor be permitted to advance all of the
costs and recover from the production attributable to the unleased one-third
interest an amount equal to double the costs of drilling attributable to such
interest.' When the owner of the one-third interest failed to reply, Windsor
assigned to a partnership of its own creation its interest in eight eighty-acre
tracts and then filed eight separate applications with the Railroad Commission
to force pool each of such eight eighty-acre tracts with the 240 acres adjacent
to it.

The Commission denied Windsor's applications. The district court of
Travis County entered judgment that Windsor take nothing by its appeal. The
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The assistance and
contributions of Andrew H. Duvall of the third-year class at the Southern Methodist University
School of Law are hereby acknolwedged.
I. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6008c (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). See generally Smith, The
Texas Compulsory Pooling Act, Part 1, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 1003 (1965).
2. 529 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
3. See Smith, The Texas Compulsory Pooling Act, Part H, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 387, 390 n.5
(1966), in which it is proposed that any change in excess of 200% recovery of costs might
presumably be unfair.
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parties stipulated that two issues existed for determination: (1)
whether there
existed "two or more separately owned tracts of land," as such term is used in
the Act, 4 and (2) whether Windsor had made a "fair and reasonable offer to
voluntarily pool," as such term is used in the Act.5 The court pointed out that
at the time of the offer not a single well had been drilled and Windsor's offer
was not to pool to create one unit of 320 acres.' The court held that Windsor's
offer for the initial drilling of eight units on a "take it all" or "leave it all"
basis coupled with a two-to-one risk factor was not a "fair and reasonable
offer to voluntarily pool." 7 The offer must be fair and reasonable from the
standpoint of the party being pooled.8
In Exxon Corp. v. First National Bank, 9 a case involving Relinquishment
Act lands,' 0 the bank sued in 1972 to set aside an order of the Railroad
Commission, issued in 1967, which pooled Relinquishment Act lands, the
surface of which was owned by the bank. Exxon had applied to the General
Land Office for its consent to the pooling and had offered all interest owners
in the unit the opportunity to pool voluntarily. The General Land Office had
consented to this request. The Bank sought a determination that the order had
no force and effect as to any interest of the state. Following a series of cases
involving suits for title to Relinquishment Act lands,"I the court held that the
bank had no authority to represent the state. 2 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that the bank's suit constituted a collateral attack on the order of the
Commission and could not be maintained since the order was regular on its
face.' 3 In addition, the bank was a party to the proceedings in 1967 and did not
appeal the order.' 4 Article 6008c, §2(g)15 provides that an order issued
thereunder may be appealed within thirty days to the district court of the
county in which the land is situated. This thirty-day provision is
jurisdictional. 16
II.

INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD "MINERALS"

CONCERNING

COAL AND LIGNITE

The identification of this survey as one dealing with "Oil and Gas" is a
misnomer. The role of coal as a source of energy is expanding, and the
reporting services thus include more cases each year involving coal and
4. 529 S.W.2d at 837. The question of whether "two or more separately owned tracts"
actually existed (their existence is required by the Act in order to propose compulsory pooling)
was never discussed. Such an issue would involve a determination of whether undivided interests
in a tract can be treated as "two or more separately owned tracts" for purposes of the Act.

5. Id.; see note 3 supra.
6. 529 S.W.2d at 837.
7. Id.
8. Id. See generally Smith, supra note 3, at 388-89.
9. 529 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5367 (Vernon 1962).
11. See Herndon v. Hayter, 28 S.W.2d 885 (Tex, Civ. App.-El Paso 1930, writ ref'd);Gulf
Prod. Co. v. Colquitt, 25 S.W.2d 989 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1930), aff'd as modified, 52
S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, jdgmt adopted).
12. 529 S.W.2d at 112-13.
13. Id. at 114. See also Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d 914(Tex. 1975), discussed at notes35-37
infra and accompanying text.
14. 529 S.W.2d at 114.
15. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6008c, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
16. Id. § 2(h).
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lignite. Various questions exist as to whether the substantive laws applicable
to oil and gas will be applied to coal and lignite. The decisions of various
jurisdictions are squarely in conflict in many instances.
A survey of cases in other jurisdictions during the past several years reveals
an increasing number of cases dealing with the questions of whether the term
''minerals" includes coal and/or lignite and whether title to coal and/or lignite
passes with the surface estate or the mineral estate.' 7 In 1971 the Supreme
Court of Texas held in Acker v. Guinn 11that a deed to an undivided one-half
interest in and to all of the oil, gas, and other minerals did not include iron ore,
although iron ore is itself a mineral, since it had to be mined by open pit or strip
mining methods which would consume or deplete the surface. The court held
that the iron ore was itself the surface, because "[i]t is not ordinarily
contemplated . . .that the utility of the surface for agricultural or grazing
purposes will be destroyed or substantially impaired."' 19 In Williford v.
Spies 20 it was held that the identical language in a reservation did not reserve
coal and lignite which must be mined by open pit or strip mining methods.
The test considered extensively in Acker was given controlling effect in
Williford and also in Wylie v. Reed, 2' the most recent case involving a
determination of this issue, and can best be termed the "surface destruction
test." The theory of this test is that the surface owner should retain title to any
substances to be mined or produced from the land which would tend to render
the surface of the land useless. The argument is thus made that the inclusion in
I'minerals" or "mineral estate" of a substance which comprises such a large
part of the surface that its removal would substantially impair the use or value
of the surface would make the grant or reservation so abhorrent to common
understanding and meaning that such result surely could not have been
intended by the parties to the instrument. In reading the statement of the rule
in Acker, 22 it would appear that in determining if a particular substance is a
mineral we are to look to the intention of the fee owner of the land who severs
his minerals and conclude that he did not intend to convey a mineral if the
taking of the particular substance will consume or deplete or substantially
17. For an anlysis of this issue see Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant of "Oil, Gas or
Other Minerals"?, 30 Sw. L.J. 481 (1976).
18. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971); see Broyles, The Right to Mine Texas Uranium and Coal by
Surface Methods: Acker v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. REV. 451 (1976); Little, LigniteSurface or Mineral? The Single Test Causes Double Trouble, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 287 (1976).
19. 464 S.W.2d at 352.
20. 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App-Waco 1975, no writ).
21. 538 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App-Waco 1976, writ granted).
22. The Texas Supreme Court stated the rule as follows:
A grant or reservation of minerals by the fee owner effects a horizontal
severance and the creation of two separate and distinct estates: an estate in the
surface and an estate in the minerals. . . .The parties to a mineral lease or deed
usually think of the mineral estate as including valuable substances that are
removed from the grounds by means of wells or mine shafts. This estate is
dominant, of course, and its owner is entitled to make reasonable use of the
surface for the production of his minerals. It is not ordinarily contemplated,
however, that the utility of the surface for agricultural or grazing purposes will be
destroyed or substantially impaired. Unless the contrary intention is affirmatively and fairly expressed, therefore, a grant or reservation of 'minerals' or 'mineral
rights' should not be construed to include a substance that must be removed by
methods that will, in effect, consume or deplete the surface estate.
464 S.W.2d at 352 (citations omitted).
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deplete the remaining surface estate. In cases such as Williford a grant or
reservation of minerals would include coal or lignite, where open pit or strip
mining operations would destroy the surface state, only if such "intention is
affirmatively and fairly expressed. ' 23 In Wylie it was held that the opinion
testimony of a landowner to the effect that coal and lignite in the area can only
be recovered by open pit or strip mining methods was not sufficient to
establish any material fact as a matter of law (to meet the Acker test) in order
to grant a summary judgment for the surface estate owner. 24 The issue of
whether it was the intention of the parties to the warranty deed to include
lignite in the reservation was avoided by the court of civil appeals, and the
Supreme Court of Texas has granted a writ of error in Wylie. Accordingly, the
validity of the application of the surface destruction test of Acker in determining the inclusion of coal or lignite in a grant or reservation of "oil, gas, and
other minerals" is in suspension until the opinion of the supreme court is
rendered.
III.

PROBLEMS OF PERPETUATION OR TERMINATION OF
OIL AND GAS LEASES

Problems inherent in the perpetuation of leases and other estates, and in the
interpretation of the covenants thereof, continually arise. Obelgoner v.
Obelgoner25 involved the effective date of a "top" lease. The facts of this
case consisted basically of three events: (1) in 1956 A granted to Xa lease for
a primary term of ten years; (2) in 1960 A gave by gift a portion of the land to
B; and (3) in 1963 A and B leased to X for a primary term of ten years. The
1963 lease stated that it was to run from the effective date thereof, but did not
refer to the 1956 lease. No production was ever obtained under any lease. The
holder of the 1963 lease contended that its term ran from the expiration of the
ten-year term of the 1956 lease. The court pointed out that the granting clause
of the 1963 lease was in the present tense,2 6 that the effective date of the lease
means the date when the lease becomes operative, and that the effective date
of the lease, and the date on which its term began, was the date set forth in the
lease, i.e., the date the lease was executed.
Morgan v. Fox27 involved several similar issues. Cross, as grantor, executed a lease to Johnson in 1970, who in 1974 conveyed the land to defendant
by a deed which contained a recitation that the land was subject to the lease.
Thereafter, defendant contended that the lease had terminated because of
inadequate production both prior and subsequent to the 1974 deed. The court
followed these well-established principles: (1) the acceptance by defendant of
the 1974 deed with such recitation constituted a ratification of the 1970 lease,
and defendant was estopped to deny the validity of the lease as of such date;
(2) once defendant repudiated the lease, plaintiff was relieved of any obligation to conduct any operations to perpetuate the lease until the controversy
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

530 S.W.2d
538 S.W.2d
526 S.W.2d
"Lessor...
536 S.W.2d

at 130.
at 189.
790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
hereby grants, leases and lets.
... Id. at 790 (emphasis by the court).
644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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over the validity of the lease was determined ;28 (3) if a small profit29 (excess of
income over expense) is realized by the lease owner from its operations, it
may be found as a matter of law that the well is producing in paying
quantities; 30 and (4) non-use by the lease owner of his equipment on the lease
did not alone raise an issue of fact as to abandonment since intention is an
31
essential element of abandonment.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Prevost 32 should be considered with the decision by the El
Paso court of civil appeals in Hughes v. Cantwell.3 3 Both cases involved the
question of whether operations by party B will perpetuate a lease or a portion
thereof, held by party A. In Prevost the question was whether the timely
commencement of operations by B on the geographical portion of a base lease
assigned to B would perpetuate the lease as to that portion thereof retained by
A. The court held that operations anywhere on the lease excused payment of
rentals as to the entire lease, whether the lease was owned in its entirety by
34
one person or owned in parcels by various parties.
In Cantwell, a case of first impression in Texas, the owner of lease A,
which covered only a small undivided interest in the minerals, contended that
the drilling of a well, in which the owner of lease A did not participate, on the
same tract by the holder of lease B, which covered the remaining undivided
interest in the minerals, excused the payment of rentals under lease A. The
court held that the lease imposed certain requirements on the lessee and it was
necessary for the lessee himself to take some action to perpetuate the lease.
These required direct or constructive operations by the lessee, and the acts of
a third party, the holder of lease B, who was a stranger to lease A would not
suffice to satisfy the requirements imposed on the lessee in lease A. The court
stated that not even production by the holder of lease B would perpetuate
lease A. The court noted that the holder of lease A had been afforded the
opportunity to participate in the well and had declined.
IV.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN HOLDERS OF DIFFERENT

.TYPES

OF MINERAL INTERESTS

35

Bolton v. Coats presented a number of questions. Bolton had assigned
leases to Coats, reserving an overriding royalty. Coats drilled a well which
was classified by the Railroad Commission as a gas well; Coats then formed a
gas unit. In a suit in Panola County, Bolton contended that the well was
erroneously classified as a gas well, that Coats owed royalty on the actual
28. Apparently, such a holding provides a remedy so as to avoid the pitfalls of not being a
good faith trespasser. See note 45 infra.
29. See Clifton v. Koontz, 163 Tex. 344, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959); Garcia v. King, 139 Tex.
578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
30. By way of dictum the court stated that this determination is made by including as an
expense all payments made to overriding royalty owners. 536 S.W.2d at 650-51.
31. This principle is also reiterated and applied in Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576,
579-80 (Tex. 1976).
32. 538 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ). See also Consolidated Oil
& Gas, Inc. v. McKendrick, No. 15491 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(unreported).
33. 540 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. 538 S.W.2d at 878. See also W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 512 (perm. ed.
1958); 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 407.2 (1975).

35.

533 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1975).
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production notwithstanding the fact that some may have been unlawfully
produced, and that Coats was liable for damages because of his failure to
protect against drainage. The district court granted Coats' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the suit was a collateral attack on an order
of the Commission. The Tyler court of civil appeals affirmed.36 On appeal the
supreme court held the following: (1) to the extent the suit challenged the
classification of the well it was in fact a collateral attack on the Commission's
order, whereas the order could be attacked only by direct appeal in Travis
County; (2) the order of the Commission classifying the well as a gas well in
one zone was not a finding that there were not separate oil productive zones
under the same land; (3) the holding of the lower court did not preclude a suit
by Bolton for his overriding royalty share of actual oil produced, even if the
oil had been produced in violation of permitted gas-oil rations; and (4) unless
an assignment reserving an overriding royalty expressly states to the contrary, the assignee of an oil and gas lease impliedly covenants to protect the
37
lease against drainage.
Mengden v. Peninsula Production Co. 38 and Monsanto Co. v. Tyrrel 39
involved dissimilar problems of payouts and reversions. In the Mengden case
Peninsula granted two separate farmouts (A and B) to Mengden. Each
provided for reversion to Peninsula of one-fourth of the interest conveyed
after recovery from production of the costs of drilling and completing.
Farmout A provided, however, that if wells were completed in the Escondido
Sand, the payout would permit recovery of $70,000 multiplied by the number
of wells, rather than actual costs. Mengden drilled three non-commercial
wells on tract A and two Escondido wells on that part of tract B included in
two units consisting of parts of both tracts. Mengden contended that in
computing the payout the costs of the unit wells should be allocated between
A and B. The court held that no part of the costs of the two unit wells which
were situated on tract B lands could be allocated to tract A for purposes of
computing the payout.
In the Tyrrell case Tyrrell's lease to Monsanto provided that when Monsanto recovered all of its costs from total production, the royalty would increase
from thirty percent to fifty percent. Monsanto and Tyrrell each executed a
separate gas purchase contract with Northern Natural Gas Company, the sole
purchaser of gas from the subject property. Northern Natural made an
advance payment to Monsanto in excess of $1,000,000 for gas to be delivered
in the future under its contract, which sum was to be recouped by Northern
Natural from thirty percent of the amount due to Monsanto for actual
36. 514 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. Bolton appears to be the first Texas case allowing implied covenants to arise between the
assignor and assignee of a lease because of a reservation of an overriding royalty. This point,
however, was not fully discussed by the court. Other cases recognize the existence of implied
covenants between assignor and assignee only when there are express covenants to drill and
develop in the lease. See Kile v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., i 18 Okla. 176,247 P. 681 (1926); Cole
Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 41 S.W.2d 414 (1931). See also M.
MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASEs 416-18 (2d ed. 1940) in which it is proposed
that implied covenants should be permitted to operate in overriding royalty situations as between
assignor and assignee.
38. 534 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ granted).
39. 537 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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production. The well had cost approximately $374,000. The trial court held
that by the term "recovery from production" the parties meant marketing of
the production and that the amount so prepaid would be applied on the
payout. The court of civil appeals held that since the term "production" has a
well established legal meaning, 4° the advance payment was to be accounted
for in computation of the payout only as the gas purchased through the
advance payment was actually produced.
In two recent cases the contention was made that reservations in a deed
were ambiguous. In DuBois v. Jacobs41 the grantor executed a deed in which
she reserved "in favor of [the grantor], her heirs and assigns [a nonparticipating royalty equal to 1/2 of whatever royalty was reserved in any
lease executed], for the term of the natural life of the grantor herein .... ",42
Repeated references were made to the estates to be vested in and the royalty
to be received by "the grantor herein, her heirs and assigns." It was
contended that the references to "heirs and assigns" and "the term of the
natural life of the grantor" created an ambiguity. The court held that the
grantor's reference to the term of her natural life was for the purpose of
directing the manner of payment and had no reference to the duration of the
interest retained, that the extent of the reservation, as a fee interest with
rights of inheritance and alienability, was controlled by the references to heirs
and assigns, and that there was no conflict. Boyd v. Welch 43 is evidence of the
fact that problems will result if grants and reservations of mineral or royalty
acres and undivided mineral or royalty interests appear in the same title. The
grantors conveyed one-half of the minerals in various specifically described
tracts. At the time of the conveyance the grantors owned a remainder interest
and Ruth Boyd owned a life estate in additional lands. The deed contained the
following provisions in addition to those ordinarily encountered in a mineral
deed:
The Grantors herein warrant and represent to the Grantee that by this
conveyance they have conveyed to him a minimum of an undivided four
hundred (400) mineral or royalty acres under the above described land
and, if on examination of title, it is determined that this conveyance
covers less than 400 mineral or royalty acres under the above described
land, the Grantors will execute such additional conveyances or issuances
to accomplish the same.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED, and herein expressly stipulated
that there is conveyed by this instrument an undivided one-half (1/2)
interest of the Grantors' interests in the life estate in the minerals now
owned by Ruth Boyd, of which, at her death, one-half(1/2) passes to the
Grantors herein.44
The grantors contended that the deed conveyed an interest only in the tracts
specifically described in the deed. The grantee contended that the deed
conveyed a one-half interest in the grantors' remainder interest in all lands in
40. "[U]nder Texas oil and gas law the clear, well-established, and unambiguous meaning of
the term 'production' is 'actual production' or the actual physical extraction of the mineral from
the soil." Id. at 137.
41. 533 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
42. Id. at 150.
43. 539 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
44. Id. at 94 (emphasis by the court).
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which Ruth Boyd owned a life estate. A jury found that the grantee's
contention represented the intent and agreement of the parties to the deed.
The court held that the deed was reasonably susceptible to more than one
meaning and, thus, ambiguous and that parol evidence was admissible to
show the intent of the parties.
The Court in Whelan v. Killingsworth45 held that a litigant who, having won
in the trial court, entered upon the lands while the case was on appeal and
drilled two wells and then lost the title question on appeal could not recover
his costs of the two wells as a good faith improver. The court of civil appeals
stated that for the purpose of determining good faith those actions taken after
a favorable judgment but before the time for an appeal has expired are in the
same category as those taken after suit is filed and before judgment is
rendered. The improver made the novel argument that the old rule should be
abolished since the energy crisis required rapid development of reserves
without the delay of appeals. The court answered that the district courts
possess ample equity powers to effect development pending appeal.
In Pritchett v. Forest Oil Corp.46 the plaintiff sought to apply to a unit
operator in its purchase of an overriding royalty the same fiduciary duty owed
by a lessee to the royalty owner when the lessee avails itself of the pooling
powers in the lease. Mrs. Pritchett bought 200 overriding royalty acres under
a lease which had pooling powers. A unit was formed with Forest as operator.
To hedge her investment Mrs. Pritchett sold fifty overriding royalty acres to a
broker, who in turn sold them to Forest, the unit operator. Mrs. Pritchett
contended that Forest, as operator, had information about a well that she did
not have. The court held that a conventional trust relationship was not created
and that no fiduciary duty was owed by a unit operator regarding the giving of
drilling information to a royalty owner who has no interest in the cost of
production.
Phillips Petroleum v. Hazlewood,47 an interpleader action, involved the
right to suspended funds in a dispute between parties to an assignment of the
properties. For many years Phillips had suspended a portion of the price paid
for casinghead gas pending the approval by the Federal Power Commission of
the price paid. In 1968 Hazlewood assigned the property to Alstar. In 1971 the
Federal Power Commission issued its order with respect to price. The
assignment contained the following provision:
This assignment is made subject, also, to the terms and provisions of that
certain Casinghead Gas Contract, made and entered into by and between
Grady Hazlewood, as 'seller' and Phillips Petroleum Company, as
'buyer' on the 11th day of January, 1962, recorded in Volume 267 at Page
72 of the Deed Records of Hutchinson County, Texas, 4but
8 covers and
includes all of Assignor's rights therein and thereunder.
45. 537 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ). See generally Houston Prod.
Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted), in which a lessee
entering land in the face of a title dispute is not held to be a good faith trespasser and hence cannot
recoup costs of his improvements.
46. 535 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. 534 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1976).
48. Id. at 62.
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The Fifth Circuit held that the quoted clause did not convey any rights not
conveyed elsewhere in the assignment and that Hazlewood was entitled to the
suspended funds.
In Armstrong v. Penroc Oil & Gas Corp.49 Penroc contended that it had
furnished to another corporation (International) the funds to pay as bonus and
fees to the state for sulphur leases covering mineral classified lands, that
International had made false and fraudulent representations, and that the
state had notice of the fraud. Penroc claimed the leases issued to International
were void ab initio and that Penroc, as a stockholder and judgment creditor of
International, was entitled to a refund of the entire sum paid the state. The
court held that only the state may challenge the validity of a lease executed by
it, and so long as the lease is not cancelled by the state, it is apparently a valid
lease and all parties thereto are bound thereby. The court additionally
concluded that there was no evidence that the General Land Office had any
notice of possible fraud, and, even if the lease were void, International had
paid money voluntarily and with full knowledge of all facts and could not have
recovered.
49.

538 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

